A
leader of the
Revolution
Discusses the
Past and
Future
by
Sutan Sjahrir
INDONESIA,
the insular
chain linking
the southern
Asian mainland
and Australia,
consists of
thousands of
islands large
and small, the
major ones
being Sumatra,
Java, Borneo,
Celebes, and
New Guinea.
These islands
draped around
the equator
like a girdle
of emerald, as
Multatuli put
it in his book
Max Havelaar
are quite
mountainous,
with many
volcanoes.
They are for
the most part
very fertile,
and though
there are
still large
jungles on the
biggest
islands
Sumatra,
Borneo, and
Celebes on
Java, Madura,
Bali, and
Lombok the
land is under
heavy
cultivation.
The
archipelago
spans a
distance of
more than
3,000 miles
from west to
east and
nearly 1,250
miles from
north to
south, and the
total land
area amounts
to nearly
740,000 square
miles. Java
and Madura
together
comprise some
50,000 square
miles, Sumatra
and outlying
islands
180,000 square
miles, the
Indonesian
part of Borneo
(the northern
section is
British
territory)
another
210,000 square
miles, and
Celebes 70,000
square miles
more, while
the Moluccas,
the Lesser
Sundas, and
Indonesian New
Guinea or West
Irian (still
claimed by
Holland, while
the eastern
part is
Australian)
together total
another
220,000 square
miles.
The
population of
Indonesia is
estimated at
around eighty
million, with
fifty-two
millions
living on
Java.
According to
the latest
figures, there
were twelve
million
inhabitants on
Sumatra, three
and a half
million on
Borneo, and
six million on
Celebes. Thus
Java, with
only seven per
cent of the
whole land
area of
Indonesia, has
about 68 per
cent of the
archipelago's
population.
Discuss
this article
in If Java is
overpopulated,
with around
1,058 persons
per square
mile, the the
Global Views
forum of other
islands are
too sparsely
settled.
Sumatra has no
more than 65
persons to the
square mile,
and the
average for
the whole of
Indonesia is
only around
109. The
present annual
population
increase is
estimated at
about one and
a quarter per
cent. For the
other islands
such an
increase is
"Indonesia's
Search for
hardly
perceptible,
except as an
augmentation
of the labor
force, but for
Java it means
a constant
increase in
the already
tremendous
population
pressure.
Among the
eighty million
people living
in Indonesia
are an
estimated
three million
of Chinese
ancestry and
far smaller
groups of
Dutch,
Indo-Europeans,
and Arabs.
While the
Dutch have
been leaving
Indonesia
since
Independence,
Chinese
immigration
has not
stopped, and
our Chinese
population is
growing.
The unity
of Indonesia
as a nation
derives from a
close
linguistic
affinity
between the
various groups
spread over
the thousands
of islands,
from a common
history, and,
to some
extent, from
common
traditions
throughout the
ages and
especially
after the
coming of the
Portuguese and
the Dutch in
the sixteenth
and
seventeenth
centuries.
Before the
arrival of the
Westerners
there had been
constant
contact with
both India and
China.
Hinduism and
Buddhism, and
later Islam,
came to
Indonesia via
India. Some
nine tenths of
all
Indonesians
are now
Muslim, but
before the
coming of
Islam in the
thirteenth
century there
was a period
when most
Indonesians
were Hindu. A
curious
remnant of
that age is to
be found on
Bali, where
most of the
people are
still Hindu.
Another relic
of the Indian
influence is
the large
number of
Sanskritic-root
words in the
Javanese
language.
From time
immemorial
traders were
attracted to
the Indonesian
islands by the
spices to be
found here.
Java was
traditionally
renowned for
its rice and
the Moluccas
for their
nutmeg and
cloves, and
long before
the arrival of
the
adventurers
from the West
there was a
lively trade
with India and
China in all
these
products. So
far as is
known this
trade never
gave rise to
large-scale
warfare. Nor
were either
the older
Indian
religions or
Islam spread
by the sword,
but by pacific
trade
contacts.
Relations with
other lands
took on
another
character only
after the
appearance of
the
Westerners.
The history
of the Dutch
East India
Company in
Indonesia was
one of trade
coupled with
violence,
cruelty, and
treachery. The
populations of
whole islands
were
exterminated
for the
benefit of the
Netherlands'
spice trade.
The
existing
Indonesian
states
decayed, and
in the course
of the
following
centuries the
Dutch were
able to
construct
their colonial
empire on the
ruins of the
old
principalities.
Yet it was a
long struggle;
not until
early in the
twentieth
century was
the last
Indonesian
state Aché in
northern
Sumatra
brought to
heel after a
prolonged war.
BUT even
while the
Dutch were
congratulating
themselves
that they had
established
their
authority
throughout the
archipelago, a
new Indonesia
was being
born.
Everywhere in
Asia in Japan,
in China, in
Turkey, in
India, and
before long in
Indonesia as
well the
spirit of
nationalism
was rising. It
was the
awakening of
Asia.
In 1908 a
group of
Indonesian
intellectuals
formed the
Budi Utomo
(High
Endeavor)
movement, with
the aim of
aiding in the
advancement of
the
Indonesians on
Java. And in
1911 the
Sarekat Dagang
Islam (Society
of Muslim
Traders), was
founded, which
soon developed
into a
nationalistic
mass movement.
Almost as
rapidly as
Dutch and
other foreign
capital
transformed
the face of
Indonesia with
plantations,
railroads,
modern roads,
and harbors,
the way of
life of the
Indonesian
people also
took on new
forms. There
emerged a
modern
nationalist
movement,
striving
towards
freedom and a
new unity of
the Indonesian
people. The
goal was
independence.
The
modernization
of Indonesia
brought with
it labor and
other social
problems.
After the
First World
War labor
unions were
founded the
largest of
them the
organization
of railway men
and the
strongest that
of pawnshop
workers. There
were strikes.
The colonial
administration
did not have
the vision to
move with the
times; it
simple tried
to suppress
these new
forces. To be
sure, there
were a few
Dutchmen who
counseled the
gradual
transfer to
native-Indonesians
of some
responsibility
for the course
of affairs in
the country,
but in general
little was
done in that
direction.
As a result
the popular
movement swung
sharply
towards
radicalism. In
the Sarekat
Islam,
originally a
movement with
a religious
background,
there
developed a
left wing
which tended
more and more
towards
radical, even
revolutionary,
socialism. In
consequence,
increasing
tensions
developed
within the
movement
itself, and
they were
encouraged by
the colonial
administration.
In 1921 there
was an open
split, and
from the left
wing the
Communist
Party of the
Indies was
born. Most of
the party's
initial
leaders had
been prominent
in the Sarekat
Islam, while
Dutch
Communists,
who had been
in close
contact with
Sarekat
Islam's
radical
elements,
provided
Communist
theories and
the "party
line."
Until the
second half of
the nineteenth
century the
Dutch had
viewed
Indonesia and
the
Indonesians
only as a
source of
profits
whether
through the
trade of the
monopolistic
East India
Company or
(after the
Company was
disbanded and
succeeded by
the Dutch
government)
through such
programs as
the compulsory
cultivation of
coffee. There
was little
concern for
the lot of the
people as long
as they were
no obstacle to
the making of
profits. There
were
practically no
social
services, few
schools, and
very little
public health
care in
Indonesia.
In the
latter part of
the nineteenth
century the
tide began to
turn. Such
enlightened
Dutchmen as
Multatuli and
Van Hoëvell
raised their
voices for the
oppressed and
"maltreated"
Indonesians.
There was a
campaign for
free labor and
free admission
of capital in
Indonesia. But
it was only
early in the
present
century that
the most
profound
changes came,
accelerating
the pace of
Indonesian
life. New
plantations,
intensive oil
drilling and
mining, and an
increase in
trade brought
better
communications
in the
interior, then
more attention
to local
administration.
Schools were
opened for the
ordinary
Indonesian,
who had to be
trained to
operate
machines,
where before,
going to
school had
been a
privilege of
the native
nobility and
higher
officialdom.
Faithful to
the tradition
of interfering
with the
"natives" as
little as
possible as
long as they
were willing
to work the
Dutch seldom
came into
direct contact
with the
people of
Indonesia;
they
controlled
them through
the local
feudal rulers.
This system of
indirect rule
became the
basic pattern
of the Dutch
colonial
administration
in Indonesia.
It was divided
into two parts
the European
administration,
replenished
from the
Netherlands,
and the
so-called
native
administration,
recruited
chiefly from
the Indonesian
feudal
nobility (for
a long time
the principle
of heredity
determined
succession in
the native
administration).
There was, of
course, a
difference in
the level of
education and
training of
the two corps
of
administrative
officials. And
a native
official could
not be
considered for
a position in
the European
administration,
so that it was
all but
impossible for
an Indonesian
to attain a
very high
rank. This
state of
affairs
continued
until the last
decades of
colonial rule
in Indonesia.
After the
First World
War a sort of
representative
council was
created, with
its members
(some of them
Indonesians)
appointed by
the Governor
General. It
was not until
shortly before
the beginning
of World War
II that this
council in
practice an
advisory body
only obtained
a native
majority. In
short, the
Dutch colonial
administration
was
extraordinarily
chary of
providing
Indonesians
with the
opportunity to
gain practice
and experience
for the tasks
with which
they found
themselves
faced after
the Japanese
occupation.
Before the
war most
Indonesians
and this was
true
especially for
Java were
illiterate
peasants and
coolies, plus
a small group
of minor
officials and
office
workers. There
were very few
Indonesian
shopkeepers or
independent
businessmen.
The Chinese
made up the
middle class,
while large
scale capital
investment in
the big
plantations,
the oil and
mining
companies, the
shipping
firms, the
banks, the
wholesale
trade was
exclusively
non-Indonesian.
Nor has this
economic
picture
changed
greatly since
Independence.
Economic and
social
differences in
Indonesia
still largely
coincide with
racial
differentiation.
Nationalism
in Indonesia
is
anti-capitalist
largely
because
capitalism
here is
Western, and,
specifically,
Dutch. This is
also one of
the reasons
why in
Indonesia
nationalism
and Communism
can go hand in
hand.
Nationalism in
Indonesia
gains its
chief support
from an
impoverished
population,
while
capitalism is
chiefly
non-Indonesian,
whether
Western or
Chinese. As a
result of
economic and
social
competition,
racial
differentiation
has been
accentuated
and distorted
into racial
antagonism.
Consequently
it is easy for
the Communists
to present
their
anti-imperialistic
and
anti-capitalistic
agitation
under the
guise of
patriotism and
nationalism,
and it is no
simple task
for the
nationalists
to detect the
true nature of
Communism.
But, to put
events in
proper
perspective,
when the
independence
of Indonesia
was proclaimed
on August 17,
1945, it was
the
Socialists,
not the
Communists,
who
predominated
in the
leadership of
the new state.
The
Pantja-Sila,
or Five
Principles set
forth in the
proclamation
were intended
as the basis
for a welfare
state in which
social justice
in the
socialist
sense should
prevail.
The force
of the
anti-colonial
and anti-Dutch
revolution of
1945 took the
Netherlands
completely by
surprise. The
Dutch had
failed to
assess the
true strength
of the
independence
movement and
could not
adjust their
thinking to
the kind of
peaceful
settlement
which the
British
accorded
India. As a
result the
colonial
regime in
Indonesia met
its end in
what was for
the Dutch a
less than
honorable way.
After the
Netherlands
had twice
attempted to
suppress the
revolution
with military
force,
negotiations
for the
transfer of
sovereignty
took place
under the
auspices of
the United
Nations, and
it was in
bitterness
towards one
another that
Indonesians
and Dutch took
their leave of
the colonial
past.
IT was only
after the
transfer of
sovereignty
from the Dutch
to the
Indonesians
late in 1949
(for the
Indonesian
part of New
Guinea West
Irian an odd
interim
solution was
found) that
the tragic
consequences
for Indonesia
of the
shortsighted
colonial
policy of the
Dutch were
felt to the
full. The
administrative
and political
experience of
the Indonesian
people proved
inadequate to
cope with the
chaotic
conditions
which ensued.
Everything
seemed
disorganized.
How could it
have been
otherwise?
There had been
two military
conflicts
first against
the Japanese
and then the
revolution
itself. There
had been, as
well, any
number of
minor
political
antagonisms
and clashes.
Then there was
the confusion
surviving from
two complete
but opposing
administrations
and civil
service corps.
Finally, two
recently
hostile armies
the
revolutionary
army of the
Republican
government in
Jogjakarta and
the army of
the colonial
Dutch Federal
government in
Jakarta had to
be amalgamated
into one. At
the outset, to
solve these
problems, and
the serious
financial
difficulties
facing the
state, the
Indonesians
seemed able to
offer little
more than
fruitless
politicking.
It was the
general
inclination to
throw all the
blame for such
seemingly
insurmountable
obstacles onto
the Dutch.
Now, more
than five
years later,
we are still
wrestling with
essentially
the same
difficulties.
The
administration
is overstaffed
for its task.
There are now
almost five
times as many
officials as
there were in
the prewar
colonial
bureaucracy,
and far and
away the
largest share
of the
government
budget goes to
pay civil
service, army,
and police
salaries. Even
so, the
salaries paid
for government
posts are far
from adequate
to meet the
constantly
rising cost of
living;
corruption is
as a result
unavoidable.
Some officials
misuse their
authority to
obtain extra
earnings for
their own
pockets, and
the large
amount of
state
interference
in economic
affairs,
inherited from
the Dutch,
provides
highly fertile
soil for the
growth of
corruption.
The whole of
economic life
is carried on
in a large
part via
government
offices and
official
papers.
In that
economic life,
trade is
central; the
state obtains
most of its
revenues by
levying heavy
duties on
imports (for
many items as
much as 200
per cent) and
(to a much
lesser extent)
on exports.
And these
duties make
for high
prices. But
the chief
source of
inflationary
pressure is
undeniably the
relatively
excessive
nonproductive
expenditure of
the
government. In
1954 the
deficit was
almost four
billion
rupiahs on a
total budget
of twelve
billion, and
for the first
half of 1955
it ran to
nearly one and
a half
billions. The
government has
been covering
these deficits
by bringing
into
circulation
new money
obtained as
loans or
advances from
the Bank of
Indonesia, but
how long can
that go on?
In recent
years world
market
conditions
have often
been against
us. We have
not always
been able to
sell our raw
materials
abroad at a
profit. Except
for oil,
exports have
not risen as
much as we had
hoped. Some
have even
fallen off.
Nor does the
nationalist
policy of
discouraging
foreign
interests from
owning or
controlling
Indonesian
firms help to
increase
trade.
To find a
way out of
this peculiar
situation an
effort is
being made to
transform the
economic
structure of
the country so
that Indonesia
will become
less dependent
on the export
of
agricultural
products.
The major
step in this
direction
must, of
course, be
industrialization.
There has been
a great amount
of talking and
writing on the
subject in
Indonesia in
recent years,
but,
unfortunately,
little has
been done.
With the aid
of specialists
provided by
the UN, a
Planning
Bureau has
drafted
various plans,
but, more
often than
not, the
government has
not been able
to carry them
through. The
chief trouble
is the
shortage of
well-trained
personnel on
every level,
from the
manager to the
skilled
worker.
Another
factor that is
now being felt
more and more
is the basic
lack of
capital. There
is no money to
finish many of
the large
state projects
already begun,
let alone
start others.
For private
enterprise,
too, monetary
difficulties
make it far
from easy to
work in the
direction of
industrialization.
The
importation of
capital goods
essential for
new industry
can seldom be
assured by the
government.
Nor can we yet
attract enough
foreign
experts. Thus,
the past five
years have
yielded few
concrete
results from
the plans for
the
encouragement
of
industrialization.
And except for
the oil
companies what
little
industry there
is bitterly
bemoans its
lot.
The total
picture
Indonesia now
presents,
after more
than six years
of national,
independent
existence, is
not
encouraging.
We are still
wrestling with
the same old
administrative
problems. The
army and its
morale can
hardly be
called ideal.
Corruption is
spreading
further and
further within
the civil
service.
Financial and
economic
difficulties
are
accumulating
at an alarming
rate. And add
to these the
fact that in
territories
such as North
Sumatra, West
Java, and
South Celebes
there been
armed
resistance
against the
government.
In the face
of these great
difficulties
and problems
the activities
of many of the
political
parties appear
nothing more
than fruitless
futile
botchwork,
rather
aggravating
the situation
than
alleviating
it. The one
party now
chuckling to
itself over
the situation
is, of course,
the Communist
party, which
no doubt hopes
it will before
long have its
inning at bat.
The Communists
supported the
earlier Ali
Sastroamidjojo
(Nationalist)
government,
because they
believed it
would lead the
country into a
blind alley
more quickly
than any
other. The
Communists
then opposed
the subsequent
Harahap regime
(coalition of
the Masjumi,
Socialist, and
other parties)
because of its
pro-Western
leanings. Now
with the
recent return
to power of
Ali
Sastroamidjojo,
at the head of
a coalition
cabinet which
represents
almost all
parties except
the
Communists, it
seems likely
that the
Communists
will continue
their militant
opposition to
the
government.
Indonesia's
activities in
the field of
foreign
affairs must
be seen in the
light of her
domestic
problems. One
key policy has
been to lay
emphasis on
the
unsatisfactory
relations with
the Dutch,
because they
still occupy
so predominant
a position in
Indonesian
economic life.
Thus, the West
Irian question
has become a
critical
issue. We long
for the world
to grant the
justice of our
case and lend
us support in
our
controversy
with the
Dutch. The
feeling that
not only in
West Irian but
everywhere the
Dutch are
still always
blocking the
road to
Indonesia
development
and progress,
especially
economically,
is very
strong. It is,
in fact, at
the core of
nationalist
sentiment.
Yet, let us
recognize it,
this point of
view is itself
an obstacle to
progress, one
which prevents
us from
becoming aware
of our own
shortcomings
and thus of
the real
nature of our
dilemma. For
what the
people of
Indonesia now
need most of
all is more
knowledge and
more skill:
more knowledge
of the present
situation with
all its
problems and
difficulties,
and more skill
to solve them.
With time and
experience
this is sure
to come, but
for the moment
we seem to be
losing the
race with
time. We still
do not know
where and how
to begin, and
meanwhile the
problems are
piling up.
One bright
spot in all
this is that
our country
people have
not yet been
greatly
disturbed by
all these
problems at
the government
level. The
people in the
desa, or
village,
produce their
own food, and
do not have so
many needs
from the
outside world.
The desa has
shown in the
past that it
can survive
without money.
In our
national
existence,
then, it goes
to make up a
vast area
where the
tendency
toward
stability and
order is at
its greatest.
Only in the
regions where
there are
rebels and
guerrillas
operating is
the desa in
turmoil.
Provided the
areas of
turbulence do
not expand,
the order and
stability of
the desa will
prove the
factor able to
prevent the
complete
national chaos
the Communists
are so hoping
for.
And as long
as that is
true, there is
still time for
us to make up
for our
shortcomings.
We can
concentrate on
obtaining more
knowledge and
understanding,
and greater
efficiency in
the government
of our state,
and on gaining
more skills,
managerial and
labor alike,
for a more
modern
economy. Then
we shall be
able to make
the state's
administration
more efficient
and its
financial
basis sounder
both of which
are definitely
preconditions
for securing
the capital
and capital
goods we shall
be needing in
constantly
increasing
quantities.
From a
long-range
point of view
the chances
for the
fulfillment of
both these
conditions are
not
unfavorable.
The Indonesian
people that is
to say, the
people in the
desa and the
masses in the
cities are
calm,
hard-working
people with
many fine
qualities.
They can
hardly be held
responsible
for the
difficulties
now facing
Indonesia. The
country's
first general
elections were
held a few
months ago,
and the
seriousness
with which
they were
taken
indicated that
the people
will be able
to assume a
share if only
a small one in
responsibility
for the course
of affairs. Up
to now it has
been only the
intelligentsia,
the
politicians,
at best the
literates, who
have been
responsible.
With their
lack of
knowledge and
experience,
the
politicians
may lead the
new Indonesian
state into a
deadlock;
nevertheless
one is
certainly
justified in
believing that
the people as
a whole will
muster the
strength to
help the
country find
its way.
I myself am
convinced that
the Communists
who believe
that
Indonesia's
existence as a
nation will
end in
complete
fiasco, are
able to do so
only because
they
underestimate
the
regenerating
strength of
the Indonesian
people.
TransIated
by James S.
Holmes and
Hans van Marle
Sutan Sjahrir
is President
of the
Indonesian
Socialist
Party. Born in
Sumatra in
1909, his
active
promotion of
expanded
educational
facilities
caused him to
be exiled in
West Irian
from 1934
until 1942.
Out of Exile,
the letters
written to his
wife during
this time, is
published in
English by The
John Day
Company, New
York. During
the Japanese
occuptaion
Sjahrir
organized an
effective
popular
resistance
movement in
Java, and from
1945 to 1947
he served as
Prime Minister
of the
Republic of
Indonesia.
Copyright ©
1956 by Sutan
Sjahrir. All
rights
reserved. The
Atlantic
Monthly;
June 1956;
"Indonesia: An
Effort to Hold
Together";
Volume 197,
No. 6; pages
117 -121.
Brieven van
een
Indonesische
nationalist
aan zijn
Hollandse
geliefde In de
dekolonisatie
van Indonesië
(1945–1949)
was een
belangrijke
rol weggelegd
voor de
kritische
jongeling
Soetan
Sjahrir, die
zich op de
middelbare
school in
Bandoeng had
ontwikkeld tot
Indonesisch
nationalist.
Eind jaren
twintig ging
hij studeren
in Amsterdam,
waar hij de
Hollandse
Maria
Duchâteau
ontmoette.
Maria werd
Sjahrirs
geliefde en
strijdkameraad
voor een vrij
Indonesië.
Niet veel
later volgde
zij hem naar
Indië, waar
hij een
politieke
partij zou
opzetten, maar
ze werd
teruggestuurd
door het
koloniale
gouvernement.
De
vele brieven
die Sjahrir
aan Duchâteau
schreef zijn
zeer
afwisselend,
met een
scherpe visie
op de
geopolitieke
situatie en
koloniale
werkelijkheid,
brieven ook
vol verlangen
en heimwee.
Ondanks hun in
1936 gesloten
huwelijk ‘met
de
handschoen’,
zagen zij
elkaar pas
weer in 1947,
anderhalf jaar
nadat Sjahrir
was
uitgeroepen
tot premier
van de
Republiek
Indonesië.
Deze keuze uit
de brieven van
een van de
grootste en
intelligentste
figuren uit de
Indonesische
geschiedenis
is gemaakt en
bezorgd door
Kees Snoek, en
wordt
aangevuld met
een
biografische
schets.
